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Abstract 
Starting from controversial findings about the relationship between party systems and the 
prospects of democratic consolidation, this article argues that problems can only be prop-
erly addressed on the basis of a differentiated typology of party systems. Contradictory re-
search results do not pose an ‘African puzzle’ but can be explained by different and inade-
quate approaches. We argue that a modified version of Sartori's typology of party systems 
provides an appropriate method for classifying African party systems. Based on Sartori's 
framework, a preponderance of predominant and dominant party systems is identified. 
This can partly be explained by the prevailing authoritarian nature of many multiparty re-
gimes in Africa as well as by the ethnic plurality of African societies. High ethnic fragmen-
tation is not transformed into highly fragmented party systems. This phenomenon can be 
attributed to the most frequent ‘ethnic congress party’ which is based on an ethnic elite 
coalition. 
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Afrikanische Parteiensysteme: Kategorisierungs- und Erklärungsprobleme 
Die Parteienforschung zu Afrika hat bisher widersprüchliche Befunde zum Zusammen-
hang von Parteiensystem und zu den Aussichten für eine demokratische Konsolidierung 
hervorgebracht. Die widersprüchlichen Ergebnisse lassen sich zunächst mit unterschied-
lichen und unangemessenen Ansätzen erklären. Zur Lösung des Problems ist jedoch eine 
differenzierte Parteiensystemtypologie notwendig. Zu einer sinnvollen Klassifizierung af-
rikanischer Parteiensysteme kann auf die Typologie von Giovanni Sartori zurückgegriffen 
werden, die allerdings modifiziert werden muss. Auf dieser Grundlage kann dann das 
Vorherrschen dominanter und prädominanter Parteiensysteme in Afrika identifiziert wer-
den. Diese können im Wesentlichen mit zwei Faktoren erklärt werden: 1. mit dem autori-
tären Charakter vieler Mehrparteienregime und 2. mit der ethnischen Pluralität afrikani-
scher Gesellschaften. Entgegen mancher Erwartungen äußert sich die hohe ethnische Frag-
mentierung nicht in hoch fragmentierten Parteiensystemen. Dieses Phänomen beruht wie-
derum darauf, dass es sich bei den weitaus meisten Parteien in Afrika um „ethnische Kon-
gressparteien” handelt, die auf einer Koalition verschiedener ethnischer Eliten fußen. Problems of Categorising and Explaining Party Systems in Africa 
Gero Erdmann and Matthias Basedau 
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1. Introduction 
Research on political parties in Africa started surprisingly late following the introduction of 
multiparty politics in the early 1990s, and it is confronted with a number of conceptual prob-
lems (Erdmann 1999; 2004; Manning 2005). While systematic research on political parties as 
organisations is still lacking, increasing attention has been focused on the new emerging 
party systems and their relation to democratic consolidation. The transformation literature is 
more or less in agreement about the relevance of the party system as a ‘partial regime’ of 
democracy. Hence parties in young democracies have a particular function which their 
counterparts in established democracies no longer have: consolidating the democratic sys-
tem and its ‘partial regimes’ (Merkel 1999: 145-6; Linz and Stepan 1996: 7; Randall and 
Svåsand 2002). A functionalist understanding suggests that the most favourable party sys-
tem is characterised by moderate fragmentation, low polarisation, and high institutionalisa-
tion (Sartori 1976). Highly fragmented party systems are considered a danger for the stabil-
ity of the political system as a whole (Sartori 1976: 119-216; Linz and Stepan 1978: 24-27), 
which applies to ‘inchoate’ party systems (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 22-28), to the ‘awk-
ward embrace’ of a dominant party (Pempel 1990; Giliomee and Simkins 1999; Rimanelli 
1999; Walle 2003) and to a polarisation as well (Basedau 2005). 6  Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa 
Yet, there is no clear indication of the type of party systems that have emerged in Africa. 
Early fears about the emergence of highly fragmented systems because of the multifaceted 
societies in Africa have proven to be unwarranted (Schmidt 1996: 53-54; Widner 1997: 66; 
Walle 2003: 302). This line of argument has a tradition in political party research as ‘polyeth-
nic’ societies are believed to have highly fragmented party systems (Sartori 1967: 180). A dif-
ferent perception of one-party domination is, however, gaining ground (Erdmann 1999: 387; 
Walle and Butler 1999; Walle 2003; Randall and Svåsand 2002). Bogaards (2004: 192) identi-
fied a ‘worrying trend to one-party dominance’, while Mozaffar et al. (2003: 388; Mozaffar 
and Scarritt 2005) believe there to be ‘low levels of fragmentation’ only. 
The research on party systems has a varied focus. Some studies try to categorise and explain 
party systems. Van de Walle and Butler (1999; Van de Walle 2003) use a dichotomous classi-
fication of ‘fragmented’ and ‘dominant’ party systems. They attempt an institutional ap-
proach to explain dominant party systems, but ignore social cleavages as a structuring force 
for party and party system formation. For Africa, this kind of ad hoc approach in party sys-
tem typologies is frequent. i 
Mozaffar and Scarritt (2005; Mozaffar et al. 2003) do not care about categorising party sys-
tems. They describe a puzzle of ‘low fragmentation and high volatility as the defining fea-
ture of African political party systems’ regardless whether the regimes are democratic or au-
thoritarian. They also try to explain this feature by strategic calculations which are struc-
tured by the institutional legacies of the previous authoritarian regimes. Finally, the ’African 
puzzle’ is gauged to be conducive to democratic consolidation. 
Kuenzi and Lambright take a different approach which generates a result that contradicts 
Mozaffar and Scarritt's findings. They focus on the institutionalisation of party systems 
without categorising or discussing different party systems (2001). Studying the relationship 
between party system characteristics and democracy, their statistical results show that party 
system stability and competitiveness are positively associated with democracy in Africa 
(2005). The implication is the number of parties, which means higher fragmentation, and the 
age of parties tend to be conducive to democracy (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005: 426f, 440). 
Unfortunately, they do not specify the number of parties required for democratic consolida-
tion. In addition, and following a different reasoning, other authors (van de Walle 2001; 
Randall and Svasand 2002) are much more sceptical about the consolidation perspectives of 
present party systems in Africa than Mozaffar and Scarritt. 
It seems that it is the research method including the question of a differentiated typology of 
party systems and not the African party system which provides a puzzle. The aim of this 
paper is to provide a comprehensive classification of Africa’s party systems in order to ex-
plain why, contrary to the expectation based on the multi-ethnicity of African societies, is Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa  7 
there a dominance of one party in a majority of African political regimes. We finally discuss 
the different approaches for and the conflicting results of assessing the relationship between 
party systems and prospects of democratic consolidation. 
 
 
2  Political Party Systems 
As Bogaards has appropriately demonstrated, Sartori’s (1976) definition of a ‘dominant’ and 
‘predominant’ party, his ‘counting rules’, and typology of political party systems are still the 
most useful for arriving ‘at an accurate classification of party systems and their dynamics in 
general, and of dominant party systems in particular’ (Bogaards 2003: 5; Mair 2002). He 
compared Sartori’s counting rules of parties with that of other scholars, especially with the 
most frequently applied ‘effective number of parties’ devised by Laakso and Taagpera 
(1979). The acknowledged problems with the latter’s measure of numbers of parties and 
their conversion to types of party systems become very evident in the African context.ii 
Bogaards points to five advantages of Sartori’s framework (table 1). First, it provides one ty-
pology of party systems for fluid polities (or ‘inchoate’ party systems) such as we can expect 
in post-transition African countries, and one for structured polities and institutionalised 
party systems that can be found not only in established democracies of Europe but in a few 
African states as well. Second, both types of party systems provide a distinction between au-
thoritarian and democratic domination that enables us to identify the nature of domination. 
This is crucial, since a particular party system can be brought about by authoritarian ma-
nipulation or by electoral decisions. Third, the concept of domination is absent in continuous 
party number measurements such as Laakso and Taagpera's. Fourth, the counting rules are 
not based on the numerical relative size of parties, but on the number of relevant actors in 
party competition and government formation. And fifth, Sartori's counting rules and defini-
tion of party systems provide an analytical framework sensitive to context and time. 
 
Table 1: Sartori’s typology of party systems 
 Monopartism   
(authoritarian) 
Polypartism 
(electoral / democratic) 
Initial stage  
(fluidity) 
Dominant  
authoritarian 
Dominant  
non-authoritarian
Non dominant  Pulverised
Structured stage  
(crystallisation) 
One party / hegemonic Predominant  Two-partism / multi-partism 
Limited / moderate pluralism 
Extreme / polarised pluralism 
Atomised 
Source:  Sartori 1976: 125, 260. 8  Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa 
In order to identify party systems in Africa, we applied a two level approach by using Sar-
tori’s counting rules and terminology for parties, and his typology for ‘fluid’ and ‘struc-
tured’ party systems where for the latter we slightly modified his concept. In the first stage, 
we tabulated the results of all elections since 1989 (regardless of their authoritarian or de-
mocratic context) according to a ‘dominant’, ‘non dominant’, or ‘pulverised’ constellation. 
We also included a few cases in which successive multiparty elections were held for a longer 
period (Botswana, Gambia, Mauritius, Senegal and Zimbabwe). 
 
Dominance and Non-Dominance 
At the fluid stage, a party is considered ‘dominant’ if it gained an absolute majority of seats 
in parliament (Sartori 1976: 199, 261). A constellation of parties without a dominant party 
but with up to five parties in parliament is ‘non dominant’; where there is no dominant 
party and the number of parties is greater than five, the system is said to be ‘pulverised’ 
(ibid. 131-2, 260). The difference between ‘non dominant’ and ‘pulverised’, however, is not 
just one of numbers. Similar to Sartori, we included a qualitative criterion which refers to the 
problem of power relations (government, coalition or intimidation potential). We look at the 
number of relevant parties which is necessary to form a parliamentary majority in support 
of the government or a formal coalition government.iii 
Out of the 139 elections three quarters (107 = 76.9%) produced a ‘dominant’ party (for data 
details see appendix). At the same time, only eight elections resulted in a constellation that 
can be termed ‘pulverised’ (one ‘pulverised authoritarian’); another 24 elections finished 
with a ‘non dominant’ party constellation. A provisional conclusion seems to be safe: the ef-
fect of multiparty elections in Africa is rarely that of a high fragmentation of parties, but 
rather the emergence of a dominant one party. 
Considering the context of the regime and the extent to which the electoral competition 
could be considered free and fair, it becomes clear that more than half of the dominant party 
constellations is due to an authoritarian environment.iv Of the 107 ‘dominant’ party results, 
57 have to be termed ‘dominant authoritarian’. On the other side, of the 32 ‘non dominant’ 
constellations, only six can be termed ‘non dominant authoritarian’ plus one ‘pulverised au-
thoritarian’, while the remaining election results are born out of a democratic context with 
18 ‘non-dominant’ and seven ‘pulverised’ constellations. From this counting it appears that 
the party constellation is to some degree patterned by the regime. The statistical analysis 
brought out the same result but also indicated that the ‘dominant party’ outcome is only 
partly supported by the regime type.v Still, almost two-thirds of the non-authoritarian elec-
tions resulted in a dominant party constellation (N = 75). And again, even under conditions 
of free and fair electoral competition, less than 10% resulted in ‘pulverised’ party constella-Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa  9 
tions; ‘non dominant’ constellations accounted for about one quarter of the free and fair elec-
tions. Interestingly, 4 out of 7 of these elections were in Benin. Highly fragmented or ‘pul-
verised’ party constellations seem to be a rather rare outcome of multiparty elections in Af-
rica. 
 
Institutionalised and Inchoate Party Systems 
At the next stage of our analysis we exclude a number of countries from our analysis which 
we consider not to be proper ‘systems’ yet. Since a ‘party system’ describes the patterned in-
teraction of the relevant parties over a certain period, we decided (also with view on the 
question of predominant or dominant party systems) to include only those countries in our 
analysis that held at least three consecutive elections.vi This criterion might appear too 
strong because even after two elections a pattern of interaction may have emerged, although 
perhaps only in a ‘fluid’ or ‘emerging’ way, we decided to err on the side of caution. 
For the final step of the classification of the party systems in Africa, and different from 
Bogaard’s (2003) approach, we distinguished between unstructured, that is ‘fluid’ or ‘incho-
ate’, and structured or institutionalised party systems. Usually, party systems in new de-
mocracies are regarded as ‘fluid’, because the whole political regime is new. However, al-
though most of the political party systems in Africa are fairly new, created only, at best, 15 
years ago, there are a few that have experienced a much longer life. Generally, it is not sen-
sible to fix a certain number of years or elections after which a fluid system becomes struc-
tured or institutionalised. Sartori’s distinction between the two states is defined by the exis-
tence of the ‘solidly entrenched mass party’ (1976: 244). The appearance of the mass party 
‘coincides’ with the structuring of the party systems and Sartori did not give any time frame 
(Sartori 1968: 280-1, 292-3). Since this fixation on the mass party tends to be misleading, we 
have applied the concept of institutionalisation (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Bendel 1996). 
This concept comprises the following dimensions: a) stability in patterns of inter-party com-
petition, b) party roots in society, c) legitimacy of parties and elections, and d) party organi-
sation. Compared to Sartori’s conception of the structured / unstructured party system, it al-
lows to identify different degrees of institutionalisation. For our purposes, we settled on the 
following indicators for a minimum of institutionalisation: 
1)  There has been at least three consecutive elections. 
2)  There has been no period of undemocratic rule, coups (unless there are three subse-
quent elections), serious civil unrest, or civil war. 
3)  A minimum level of institutionalisation within the party system itself: the volatility 
(seats) according to Pedersen (1979) is not higher than a value of 40,vii and the (aver-10  Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa 
age) party age must be at least 15 years or nearly as high as the years passed by since 
the founding elections when being held after 1990. 
 
The results are given in table 2. We find that 16 party systems qualify as ‘institutionalised’, 
of which the seven hegemonic cases underwent ‘institutionalisation’ under non competitive 
conditions. Of the remaining nine cases, which are considered to be institutionalised in a 
democratic context, more than a half (55.6%) are predominant (Botswana, Namibia, Sey-
chelles, South Africa), two (22.2%) are characterised by moderate pluralism (Mauritius, São 
Tomé) and two are regarded as two-party systems (Ghana, Cape Verde).viii The only pulver-
ised system, Benin, does not qualify as institutionalised because of the high volatility (40.9) 
and the young party age (9.6, founding elections 1991). 
The final result is obvious: contrary to many expectations, highly fragmented party systems 
are rare under democratic conditions in Africa. Instead, dominant and predominant party 
systems are prevalent, even in institutionalised party systems in a democratic environment. 
This calls for an explanation, especially when this phenomenon is compared to the western 
world and also to young democracies of the third wave in Eastern Europe where predomi-
nant and dominant party systems have been quite unusual. As indicated above, authoritari-
anism can only explain some cases, but not, for example, the predominant party systems of 
South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Seychelles, and Botswana. To explain the perhaps 
surprising lack of highly fragmented party systems we need to look at two other causes: 
firstly, the electoral system, and, secondly, the cleavage structure and its possible effects on 
the evolution of the party systems. 
 
 
3  Electoral System and One-party Dominance 
According to the classical institutional approach, party systems depend on the respective 
(legislative) electoral system.ix A large body of literature has been devoted to the study of re-
spective effects of electoral systems but little theoretical and empirical effort has been spent 
on the link between electoral systems and dominant party systems. Duverger’s laws (1951) 
have been demoted to hypotheses or a probabilistic connection (Duverger 1986: 71; Nohlen 
2003: 396) and Duverger never tried to explain one-party dominance but different levels of 
fragmentation, namely two-party and multiparty systems. Likewise, Mozaffar et al. (2003) 
and Lindberg (2005) who have been working on contemporary African party systems focus 
on different levels of fragmentation, measured by the Laakso / Taagepera-Index of ‘effective 
parties’ discussed above, without addressing dominant party systems as such. Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa  11 
Table 2: Classification of party systems according to institutionalisation and regime type 
Countries  Fluid / inchoate  Institutionalised 
Benin (b)  Pulverised   
Comoros (a)  Non-dominant-authoritarian  
Congo-Brazzaville (a)  Non-dominant-authoritarian  
Côte d’Ivoire (a)  Non-dominant-authoritarian  
Gambia (a)  Dominant-authoritarian   
Guinea-Bissau (a)  Non-dominant   
Kenya (a)  Non-dominant   
Lesotho (a)  Dominant   
Madagascar (a)  Non-dominant   
Malawi (b)  Non-dominant   
Mali (a)  Non-dominant   
Niger (a)  Non-dominant   
Nigeria (a)  Dominant   
Senegal (b)  Non-dominant   
Zambia (b)  Non-dominant-authoritarian  
Zimbabwe (a)   Dominant-authoritarian   
Burkina Faso  Dominant-authoritarian  Hegemonic 
Cameroon  Dominant-authoritarian (near) Hegemonic (near) 
Djibouti  Dominant-authoritarian  Hegemonic 
Equatorial Guinea  Dominant-authoritarian  Hegemonic 
Gabon  Dominant-authoritarian  Hegemonic 
Mauritania  Dominant-authoritarian  Hegemonic 
Togo  Dominant-authoritarian (near) Hegemonic (near) 
Botswana Dominant  Predominant 
Cape Verde  Non-dominant  Two-party 
Ghana Non-dominant  Two-party 
Mauritius Non-dominant  Moderate  pluralism 
Mozambique   Dominant  Predominant 
Namibia Dominant  Predominant 
São Tomé  Non-dominant  Moderate pluralism 
Seychelles Dominant  Predominant 
South Africa  Dominant  Predominant 
N / N Dominant (%)  32 / 16 (50.0%)  16 / 13  (81.2%) 
N / N Democratic Context (%)  32 / 19 (59.4%)  16 / 9  (56.2%) 
N Democratic Context / N Dominant (%) 19 / 7 (36.8%)  9 / 5  (55.6%) 
Notes:  (a) Fluid or inchoate system because of either (1) violent regime change after last elections; or (2) civil 
unrest or coup before last or second last election (1 or 2 elections afterwards). 
    (b) Fluid or inchoate system because of low institutionalisation of party system: party age per seat lower 
than time span since founding elections and / or high volatility on Pedersen Index (40 and more) in last 
election. 
    Counting rules: 3 consecutive elections with an absolute majority of seats of the same party makes the 
system dominant; regime change requires new counting; the regime type of the last election determines 
the regime attribute (authoritarian) of the party system. 
    16 Countries are excluded because they held less than the required three multiparty elections since 1990 
to end 2004. 
Sources: Dominance and volatility: Nohlen et al. 1999, supplemented by African Elections Data Base. Regime 
Type: Freedom of the world (see footnote 6); Party age: Szajkowski 2005. 12  Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa 
However, if we want to adapt the classical institutional knowledge to our research problem 
we can expect that less proportional (legislative) electoral systems favour one-party domi-
nance. It is widely acknowledged that non-proportional electoral systems reduce the num-
ber of parties represented in parliament thus creating a higher probability for concentration 
and therefore one-party dominance. In particular, in highly disproportional electoral sys-
tems, political parties can accomplish absolute majorities in the seat share without com-
manding a respective majority in the votes share, maybe even as low as 35%. 
In contrast, in his study of Italy, Israel, Japan, and Sweden, T.J. Pempel (1990: 336-9) has ob-
served that one-party dominance is typically connected to several variants of proportional 
representation (PR). He reverses the hypothesis developed by arguing that PR systems fa-
vour multipartism in which ‘one party typically needs far less than 50% percent of the seats 
in parliament to be dominant’. Although this definition of one-party dominance does not 
match with our criterion of subsequent absolute majorities and Pempel is clear about the 
limited effect of electoral systems, he concludes, ‘that a system that fosters and encourages 
multipartism is certainly a precondition for the emergence of one-party dominance’. 
In order to test our hypotheses of non-proportional or proportional electoral systems being 
the major cause or a precondition of one-party dominance, we will use a typology of elec-
toral systems that takes into account their most pertinent technical elements as regards their 
(dis)proportional effects: the voting procedure and the size of the constituency. Some still 
use the threefold classification of Duverger (Walle 2003) and others (Lijphart 1994; Kuenzi 
and Lambright 2001: 451; Mozaffar et al. 2003: 387) prefer the (average) district magnitude, 
i.e. the number of mandates obtainable in a district or constituency, as the most valid indica-
tor for disproportionality. However, only the combination of both elements – let alone other 
technical elements such as artificial thresholds of representation – captures effects of dispro-
portionality adequately. Depending on the majoritarian or proportional principle, the effect 
of the district magnitude takes an opposite trajectory. In majoritarian systems, a higher dis-
trict magnitude increases the (potential) disproportionality whereas, contrarily, a higher dis-
trict magnitude in PR systems reduces disproportionality. Consequently, PR systems in 
small multi member constituencies (MMCs) – especially when combined with legal thresh-
olds – have a more reductive effect than PR systems with a small number of large districts or 
just one in pure PR systems (Nohlen 2003: 82-88.; Nohlen et al. 1999: 22). On the other hand, 
plurality in MMC is more disproportional than plurality in single member constituencies 
(SMC).x 
We applied a typology of electoral systems that corresponds to Nohlen et al. (1999: 22) and 
is fairly comparable to Lindberg’s (2005: 58) but has been updated and completed with re-
gard to several cases (table 3). The six classes range from the most disproportional electoral Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa  13 
system (Plurality in MMCs) to the most proportional one (pure PR in a single national dis-
trict). Segmented systems including elements of different types (Chad 2002; Guinea 1995-
2002; Madagascar 1993-2003; Niger; Senegal) are coded according to the relative weight of 
their elements.xi In the special case of Lesotho, the mixed member proportional system 
(MMPS), introduced in 2002, is effectively a segmented system. 
 
Table 3: Electoral systems and party systems 
 Dominant  Two-party Moderate   
pluralism 
Extreme  
pluralism 
% one-party 
dominance 
Plurality in MMC  Djibouti   MAURITIUS   50% 
Plurality in SMC  BOTSWANA 
Gambia 
Ethiopia 
Lesotho (1993-98) 
Nigeria 
Tanzania 
ZIMBABWE 
GHANA 
Kenya* 
Côte d’Ivoire*
Malawi 
Zambia 
 58% 
Absolute majority  
in S / MMC 
CAMEROON 
Chad (1997) 
Gabon 
Mauritania 
Togo 
  C. African Rep.
Comoros 
Mali* 
Congo-B. 56% 
Segmented systems  
& MMPS 
Chad (2002) 
Guinea 
Lesotho (2002) 
SEYCHELLES 
Senegal* Niger 
Madagascar 
 57% 
PR in small MMC**  Burkina Faso (1992-97) Cape Verde* Guinea-Bissau
SAO TOME 
Benin (1995-2003)  25% 
PR in medium  
& large MMC** 
Burkina Faso (2002) 
Equat. Guinea 
Mozambique 
S. Leone (2002) 
   Benin  (1991)  80% 
Pure PR  NAMIBIA 
South Africa 
  S. Leone (1996)   67% 
Notes:  MMC = Multi-member Constituencies; MMPS = Mixed Member Proportional System; PR = Proportional 
Representation; SMC = Single-Member Constituencies. 
    * Before last election one-party dominance in two subsequent elections. 
    ** Small MMC have a maximum average district magnitude of 5, medium of 6-9, large of at least 10. 
    ’Structured / institutionalised party systems’ in italics (table 2); cases with less than two multiparty elec-
tions between 1990 and mid 2004 are excluded; Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Lesotho, and Sierra Leone 
are listed twice due to substantial changes in electoral systems. 
Sources: Hartmann 2006; Nohlen et al. 1999, adjusted by the authors. 
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As shown in table 3, certain electoral systems are not systematically connected to dominant 
party systems. This can be easily illustrated by the fact that one-party dominance occurs in 
all kinds of electoral systems. No electoral system uniquely determines the respective party 
system. Although the most proportional systems have the highest ratio of one-party domi-
nance, which favours Pempel’s argument over the classical institutional approach, PR sys-
tems are clearly not a necessary condition for one-party dominance. A similar pattern 
emerges when we focus on ‘structured party systems’ or embark on a more quantitative ap-
proach. There are constantly weak and insignificant correlations regardless which measure 
for electoral system or dominance is applied.xii 
With Duverger’s (1951) strict ‘mechanical logic’ it could even be argued that only artificial or 
‘manufactured majorities‘ (Douglas W. Rae) – a vote share of less than 50% of the public 
vote is turned into an absolute majority of seats – mean that the electoral system produces 
absolute majorities or one-party dominance. However, artificial majorities are rare in Afri-
can party systems. Of 106 elections, only 17 absolute majorities were ’manufactured’ by the 
electoral system. Only 8 out of 21 dominant party systems were partly favoured by an artifi-
cial majority.xiii 
Furthermore, the link between disproportional electoral institutions and dominance be-
comes more questionable when we keep in mind that the effects of electoral systems are not 
limited to fragmentation (Lindberg 2005; Nohlen 2003; Lijphart 1994). Given that relatively 
weak shifts in voting behaviour can make a crucial difference in the share of seats, it can be 
concluded that non-proportional systems favour (ceteris paribus) both concentration and 
change. Because electoral turnovers in parliamentary elections inevitably contradict the very 
notion of one-party dominance, which we have defined as an absolute majority of one and 
the same party in three subsequent elections, we should not necessarily expect non-
proportional systems to produce dominance. In fact, if we exclude founding elections which 
often mean a turnover of power per se we find subsequent turnovers especially in various 
majoritarian systems. Simple plurality systems such as in Kenya and Ghana are cases in 
point. The only exception is São Tomé (PR in medium MMC, but two turnovers). This be-
comes more obvious when we observe that pure PR and PR in medium and large MMCs is 
rarely conducive to turnovers. 
Given this evidence it appears that legislative electoral systems are not the major reason for 
one-party dominance in sub-Saharan Africa. There is no evidence that links particular elec-
toral systems to one-party dominance in contemporary Africa. At best, there might be a ten-
dency that non-proportional or proportional electoral systems helped establish dominant 
party systems in some countries. This is not to say that electoral systems do not affect party 
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(Lindberg 2005; Mozaffar et al. 2003; Walle 2003; Basedau 2002). All this is less of a puzzle 
when we embark on a more contextually sensitive approach towards the effects of electoral 
systems (Sartori 1994; Nohlen 2003). In fact, the distinction between more or less propor-
tional electoral systems looses much of its significance when parties have regional strong-
holds. According to Sartori (1994) electoral systems only produce specific types of party sys-
tems when party systems are structured and respective voters are not geographically con-
centrated. Given the ethno-regional constellation in many African countries, it is of no sur-
prise that the electoral system does not play a very important role in determining one-party 
dominance. 
 
 
4  Social Cleavage and (Pre-)dominant Party Systems 
So far the authoritarian regime has some explanatory value for the preponderance of (pre-
)dominant party systems while the electoral system has little, if any, such value. To apply 
the social cleavage concept as a useful explanation for the predominant or dominant party 
systems seems, at first sight at least, to be paradoxical, because ethnicity has been identified 
as the most crucial cleavage for party formation in Africa (Scarritt and Mozzafar 1999; Erd-
mann and Weiland 2001; Erdmann 2004). 
As indicated above, the multiplicity of ethnic groups was thought to be the major reason for 
the emergence of highly fragmented party systems which, however, has not become a real-
ity. The hypothesis will be reversed here: it is precisely the multiplicity of ethnic groups 
brings that about the predominant or dominant party systems and the fewer number of pul-
verised / atomised party systems. 
With the exception of a few countries, most African societies are characterised by a high 
number of ethnic groups of different sizes. It is only in Botswana, Namibia, Burundi, and 
Rwanda that we find an ethnic group that counts for a large portion or even for a majority of 
the population, although even in these cases the main group can be broken down into 
smaller groups. In most African countries, none of the ethnic groups can claim to be a major-
ity. 
A few examples in table 4 give a clear indication that any equation of ethnic groups with po-
litical parties does not make sense. In fact, for the classification of African political parties 
we have used the term ‘ethnic congress party’ as the most common type of party in Africa. 
By definition this party is a multiethnic party based on a elite coalition of two or more ethnic 
groups.xiv Yet, the ethnic congress party is to be distinguished from the ‘ethnic party’ which 
is based on one ethnic group only, and which is rather an exemption in Africa (Erdmann 16  Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa 
2002: 270-8; 2004: 78-80). Although ethnicity based, the ethnic congress party is non-
particularistic in appearance, which means these parties do not promote sectionalist pro-
grams but pose as national parties. 
 
Table 4: Number of ethnic and ethnopolitical groups, parties and party systems per 
country 
 Ethnic  groups 
(language groups /  
groups / subgroups)1 
Largest group of A
in () out of group 
number in A 
Ethno-politico groups / 
subgroups 
Party  
system 
Parties () or  
electoral alliances3
 A  B    [regional  groups]2  in  parliament 
Benin  3 / 15 / 14  about 60  25% Fon (15)  4 / 5 [2]  Atom. / pulver.  12 (16) 
Ghana  4 / 13 / 16  64 (7-9)  44% Akan (4)4  4 / 6  Two-party  4 
Kenya  6 / 32 / 25  36  21% Kikuyu (32)  11 / 11  Non-dom.  7 (13) 
Malawi  5 / 16 / -  11  46% Chewa  3 / 8  Non-dom.  6 (9)5 
Namibia  7 / 9 / 16  10  46% Ovambo (7)  7 / 3 / -  Predom.  7 
Senegal  6 / 9 / -  19  38% Wolof (6)  3 (+4) / 3  Non-dom.  10 (2) 
Tanzania  9 / 45 / 41  130 (4)  19% Nyamwesi (9) 12 / - [2]  Dom.-auth.  6 
Zambia  6 / 17 / 68  76 (7)  37% Bemba (6)  5 / 12  Non-dom.-auth.  7 
Notes:  1) A = Morrison 1989 (groups with more than 5% of population; B = BND 1998 (all groups). 
    2) Scarritt / Mozzafar 1999; the second figure gives the number of sub-groups with a known political 
identity; the third figure is related to a politically articulated regional identity. In Benin it is Northerner 
and Southerner; in the case of Malawi the first figure 3 is a regional identity based on administrative 
units; however there are major doubts that this is really a political identity; although some authors 
maintain this, particularly for the Northern Region, the Afrobarometer could not detect this as a wide-
spread identity. 
    3) According to the last election results (elections around the world, www.electionworld.org; Political 
Parties 2005); in () number of parties which form an electoral alliance of one of the parties. 
    4) Among the Akan group Ashanti account for about 28%; Akan do not operate as a political unit. 
    5) There were 7 parties in the Mgwirizano Coalition of which 4 won seats; in addition there were 40 in-
dependent MPs. 
Sources: Morrison 1989; BND 1998; Scarritt / Mozzafar 1999. 
 
It is important to note here that we are using two problematic conceptions, ethnicity and so-
cial cleavages. Firstly, social cleavages do not in themselves automatically provide the basis 
for party formation. According to Lipset and Rokkan (1967) a social cleavage needs to be 
politicised and transformed by a political elite before it leads to party formation, but not all 
politicised social cleavages are necessarily transformed into party formation as the politicisa-
tion can, for instance, ‘stop’ at level of a social movement. As regards the ethnic cleavage, 
Mozzafar et al. (2003: 382) have captured this process in a three-step process: the ‘construc-
tion’ of an ethnic identity, its ‘politicisation’, and finally the ‘particisation’, a term borrowed 
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Scarritt and Mozzafar (1999) have taken the ethnicity issue a step further. They use the con-
cept of ‘ethnopolitical groups’ based on a constructivist concept of ethnicity. They consider 
only politicised ethnic cleavages. This reduces the number of groups which are of substan-
tial relevance. Nevertheless, even in this case, the simple equation of ethnopolitical groups 
and political parties does not hold (they do not claim it would) as seen from the few cases in 
table 4.xv 
The table also indicates the problem of identifying and counting ethnic groups. Different 
approaches and definitions generate different results; one concept is largely based on ‘lan-
guage and culture’ (table 4, A), the other on ‘language’ (table 4, B) only. Hence, the crucial 
problem is the concept of ethnicity, and how ethnicity translates into the evolution of party 
systems. While we cannot go into detail about this transformation here, we will try to de-
scribe the intricacies involved and the complexity of this process. 
Ethnicity is understood here as a historically, socially, and politically constructed identity; it 
is multifaceted, changeable, and can have multiple meanings.xvi It is based on the interaction 
of self-ascription and ascription by others. Ethnicity can, but most often does not, have fixed 
boundaries or orderly delineated entities. Ethnic identity can have different forms of expres-
sion or, to put it differently, covers different kinds of socio-political identities or societal self-
consciousness which is moulded by social (including habitual or cultural), economic and po-
litical factors. 
While ethnicity is variable and multifaceted, so are ethnic cleavages, and hence the articula-
tion of ethnic cleavages in the political arena. There is no clear cut pattern of how ethnicity 
and ethnic politics affect and structure party formation and party politics. A plausible hyp-
thesis is that the following factors might contribute to the political articulation of ethnic 
cleavages and its transformation into party formation: 
4)  The numbers and relative sizes of the ethnic groups. 
5)  The physical distribution of these groups whether concentrated or dispersed. 
6)  The quality (or intensities) of the various ethnic identities, i.e. the degree to which 
coexisting ethnicities are politically mobilised or not. This includes different levels 
(national, regional, local) of political articulation as well as intra ethnic group divi-
sions. 
7)  Some degree of historical contingency matters, particularly under circumstances of 
fluidity of both ethnic identity and political institutions.xvii 
 
This leads to the observation that although the possible line of causation is from a politicised 
ethnic cleavage to party formation, party formation and party politics might also contribute 
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other new party.The crucial point here is that no simple equation of ethnic cleavages and 
ethnopolitical groups with party formation is possible and, most importantly, the number of 
politically articulated ethnic groups is much smaller than the relevant parties in parliament. 
In fact, Mozzafar et al. (2003) found that there is an inverse relationship between the number 
of ethnopolitical groups and the number of (electoral and legislative) parties: the higher the 
number of ethnopolitical groups, the smaller the number of parties. 
Despite the conceptual problems involved there are strong indicators that once an ethnic 
cleavage has been politicised and ‘particisation’ it can become more or less permanent. In a 
number of countries the ethnic cleavage constellation and party formations of the 1950s and 
1960s correspond to the evolution of party formation and inter-party conflicts of the 
1990s.xviii 
Given the stark incongruity of the number of ethnic (or ethnopolitical) groups and political 
parties it is evident that most of the bigger parties are based on a coalition of various ethnic 
groups as it is suggested by the concept of the ethnic congress party. The question remains, 
what makes these ethnic coalitions possible, which are sometimes comprised of several poli-
ticised ethnic groups, and even more that have not been visibly politicised? The answer is 
rather simple: political leaders realise that the ethnic group from which they come is too 
small for the party to make it into government.xix A winning party here means obtaining suf-
ficient votes for a majority in parliament and sufficient support to get the presidential can-
didate elected because most African states operate a presidential system. Hence, the party 
leadership can rarely appeal to a single ethnic group. In order to avoid being seen as a rep-
resentative of that group they have to appear national or at least ‘multi-ethnic’. To form a 
winning majority, party leaders have to forge a ‘maximum coalition’ of various ethnic 
groups. This maximum coalition depends, of course, on electoral rules for the presidency as 
well as for the members of parliament. If the president is elected by a relative majority, the 
‘maximum’ coalition can be smaller than if an absolute majority is required. In order to 
avoid the cumbersome business of building the maximum coalition and to reduce the win-
ning maximum coalition, constitutions have been changed from an absolute to a relative ma-
jority rule for the presidency since re-democratisation. The problem at the constituency level 
is usually less complicated. This is because, firstly, constituencies are frequently based on 
ethnically homogenous groups, except, of course, in major urban areas, and a number of ru-
ral constituencies have similar multi-ethnic characteristics. And secondly, parliamentary 
elections used to require a relative majority only. Particularly in these multi-ethnic areas po-
litical functionaries make very clear strategic ethnic calculation which person (with which 
ethnic identity) is to be placed in which constituency in order to win. Taken together, it is 
the strategic decision making of political elites of various ethnic groups that turns the high Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa  19 
number of groups into a small number of parties, and if the strategic coalition building was 
successful, it turns out to be a dominant or predominant party system. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
As a precondition for the studying the effects of different party systems on the consolidation 
of democracy we maintain that a differentiated categorisation of party systems is required. 
By applying basic features of Sartori’s counting rules and his fully fleshed party system ty-
pology, including the difference between institutionalised and non-institutionalised sys-
tems, we are able to show a differentiated picture of party systems in Africa that also distin-
guishes between party systems which are structured by authoritarian and democratic fea-
tures. This distinction between authoritarian and democratic features is crucial because we 
can expect that even multi-party systems might change under democratisation. On this basis 
we can start analysing which particular type might be more conducive for consolidating 
democracy than others. The traditional academic wisdom, although inspired by a different 
societal context, mainly by the experience of western European party systems, suggests that 
of the eleven democratic and institutionalised party systems about five, the two-party as 
well as the moderate pluralism, should be seen as conducive to consolidation, while some of 
the five predominant party systems might be in a danger of losing its democratic direction. 
Yet, from experience in Europe and Asia we also know that a predominant party system 
need not to be a hindrance to consolidating democracy. 
At the same time we are called for caution as regards the remaining party systems. It is diffi-
cult to pass judgement on the not yet institutionalised party systems that prevail in the ma-
jority of African countries. For example, the fate of the dominant party system of Zambia of 
the 1990s which collapsed into a fragmented or non-dominant authoritarian system reminds 
us of the fragility of many of the party systems. The fragmentation of Malawi’s party system 
and especially of its major party before the last elections is another case. However, the dif-
ferentiation of party systems can only be a start for the analysis of the impact of the various 
party systems, and further research is required because the African context might provide 
different outcomes from those expected by the conventional European biased wisdom. 
Mozaffar and Scarritt’s approach of identifying a kind of ‘average’ party system for more 
than thirty political systems in Africa does not allow such a differentiated analysis. Their 
findings suggest that the party systems in Africa are equally conducive for consolidation re-
gardless of the number and constellation of parties in each party system. This, however, 
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tried to democratise, succeeded for a period but returned to a hybrid or authoritarian re-
gime. How can this difference in outcome be explained by an ‘average’ party system? One 
consequence could be that party systems just do not matter. This, however, is certainly not 
the intention of the authors of the African ‘puzzle’. In any case, what would we gain for 
identifying an ‘average’ party system for Europe? 
As indicated in the introduction, one problem is that different writers come to quite different 
assessments of the chances for consolidation. Again, the contradictions can partly be ex-
plained by different approaches. Mozaffar and Scarritt’s research design is focusing on the 
explanation for the formation of political party systems; they treat the party system as a de-
pendent variable. In the end assume, ‘counter intuitively’ as they write (Mozaffar and Scar-
ritt 2005: 417), that the African party systems may be conducive to consolidation. Kuenzi 
and Lambright apply a different approach. They explicitly ask how the different characteris-
tics of the party systems affect the democratic outcome. While Mozaffar and Scarritt rather 
suppose the positive effects of ‘low fragmentation’ on democratic consolidation, Kuenzi and 
Lambright can statistically identify a weak positive correlation between numbers of political 
parties (i.e. higher fragmentation) and democracy. Obviously, they address the question 
about the relationship between party system and democracy is directly, while Mozaffar and 
Scarritt essentially tackle a different question, what explains the evolution of party systems 
in Africa, hence, they can only speculate about the link between party system and democ-
racy. One problem remains with Kuenzi and Lambright’s findings in that they do not sug-
gest how many parties are conducive for democracy. Is it five or eight or perhaps even 15 
political parties? The latter number would seem to be not very plausible because it makes 
government formation and governing more difficult. 
From a different angle, Van de Walle (2003) as well as Randall and Svåsand (2002a) disagree 
with Mozaffar and Scarritt’s (2005; Mozaffar et al.). They are rather pessimistic about the 
prospects for consolidation, but also caution against passing judgment too soon by citing a 
few positive developments. Again, the contradicting assessment is related to a different re-
search focus. Mozaffar, Scarritt, Kuenzi and Lambright focus on the party system, while van 
de Walle and Randall and Svåsand rather concentrate on parties or party structures, and by 
identifying serious weaknesses conclude that these parties will even undermine the process 
of democratic consolidation (van de Walle 2003: 316). It is interesting to note here that a 
similar confusion of concepts has been pointed out by Randall and Svåsand (2002) related to 
the question of institutionalisation of parties and party systems. 
Hence, for future research on these problems, we need conceptual clarity about, firstly, what 
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tems to the consolidation of democracy) and, secondly, what will be the focus of our re-
search as the explanans: the party system, party structures or even both? 
At the same time we also need to consider the problems of the particular type of party, the 
ethnic congress party, we most often find in Africa. These parties and party systems they 
constitute might display their own dynamics of which we have hardly any systematic re-
search results. Two hypotheses are possible: The dynamics of ethnic congress party politics 
might entail a specific culture of ‘compromise’ and moderation as suggested by Mozaffar et 
al. (2003). Yet, it can also lead to pointed ethnic polarisation, which is different from the clas-
sic ‘class-based’ ideological right-left polarisation, but can unfold even more violent and dis-
astrous effects on the polity. Finally, we should forget that there are other factors than par-
ties and party systems that might be even more important to explain the consolidation of 
democracy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
i    See for example: ‘Dominant’ and ‘competitive’ party systems (Rakner and Svåsand, 2004), or 
Sandbrook’s (1996) ‘stable two party system’ and ‘unstable factional system’. Only Cranenburg 
(1996) categorises the Tanzanian party system within Sartori’s typology as a dominant party sys-
tem, and Randall and Svåsand (2002a) discuss only Sartori’s (non-authoritarian) dominant party 
system. 
ii   Generally, the number of effective parties can be very misleading: (a) identical values can hide 
very different party systems; (b) the value itself does not necessarily indicate the actual number of 
represented parties and their relative strength in parliament. One example will illustrate the case 
while many others are at hand: Ghana in 2000 showed 2,2 effective parties, thus reflecting the ap-
proximate two-party system with the two major parties having a seat share of 50% and 46% re-
spectively. However, in Mali in 1992, 2,2 effective parties hide a dominant party with 65,5% seat 
share and 9 small parties (biggest: 7,8% seat share); see also Bogaards, 2004: 184-188. 
iii   The criterion is a) number of parties starting with the strongest which are necessary to come up to 
more than 50% of seats in parliament and / or b) the number of parties which de facto form the 
government. In cases (e.g. Benin) where the winning party was already a coalition on a joint list 
and three or four other parties were necessary to obtain an absolute majority in parliament, we 
classified them as ‘pulverised‘. 
iv   We used the Freedom House index to qualify the resulting regime. Free and partly free cases be-
low the mean value of the index (3.5) represents a non authoritarian context, all others an authori-
tarian context. 
v   In 133 sub-Saharan elections a dominant election outcome (dummy absolute majority seat share) is 
likelier in an authoritarian environment, measured by average Freedom House ratings (Pearson’s r 
= .76, significant at the 0.01 level). Using exact seat share values of the winning party instead of the 22  Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa 
                                                                                                                                                                     
absolute majority dummy, however, produces a similarly significant but much lesser convincing 
result (Pearson’s r = 0.21). 
vi   This excludes – apart from those countries which did not have any multiparty elections at all: DR 
Congo, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland and Uganda – the following countries (end of 2004): 
Angola, Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda (all one election only); CAR, Chad, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, and 
Tanzania (two elections). 
vii  Pedersen’s volatility index: Volatility (Vt) = ½ x TNCt (Total Net Change). We set a maximum 
volatility (TNC) of 40 for institutionalised party systems (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001: 445-6). TNC 
over 40 receives the lowest coding for institutionalisation and indicates an ‘inchoate’ party system 
in this indicator. 
viii  This number is clearly higher than that of Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) who have identified the 
following institutionalised systems: Botswana, Gambia, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa based 
on a different operationalisation and counting approach, but also based on fewer number of elec-
tions. 
ix   As regards the impact of the system of government, parliamentary or presidential, we could not 
find little explanatory power, therefore we refrain from a more detailed discussion. The literature 
(e.g. van de Walle 2003) suggestest a close association of presidential systems and one-party 
dominance. However, out of ten parliamentary systems four had a dominant party system, and 
out of 28 presidential systems twelve evolved a non-dominant party system (Basedau 2005). 
x   This can easily be illustrated by the vast disproportionality in Djibouti and Mauritius, in both 
cases favouring the winning parties (Thibaut and Krennerich in Nohlen et al. 1999). 
xi   The validity of operationalisation (the adjusted typology by Nohlen et al.) is supported by the high 
correlation between a respective coding (ranging from 1 to 6) and the bonus of the winning party 
of seat vis à vis the vote share (Pearson’s r2 .492, significant on the .01 level) which is higher than 
for district magnitude and the original typology of Nohlen et al. 
xii  Dominance was measured by an absolute majority (regardless of outcome of previous elections) 
and a dominant result (ruling party upholding absolute majority). Electoral systems were meas-
ured by district magnitude, the typology of Nohlen (1-6), the adjusted typology of Nohlen (in 
segmented systems the types were weighted according to the seat share of the respective system), 
the proximity of presidential elections and the type of presidential electoral system (absolute vs. 
plurality). None of the correlations proved to be significant (N 103 – 132), the highest being Pear-
son’s r .146 (presidential electoral system). Moreover, a presidential system of government is not 
the main cause of one-party dominance: out of five (quasi) parliamentary systems (without presi-
dential elections) four have dominant party systems (Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho and South Af-
rica) the only exception being Mauritius. 
xiii  In the case of Mozambique, in 1994 and 1999 (but not in 2004), the artificial threshold of represen-
tation (5%) was mainly responsible for creating ‘manufactured’ absolute majorities for Frelimo 
(see Krennerich in Nohlen et al. 1999). 
xiv  Yet, this leaves the question open whether there are other types than ethnic based parties in Africa; 
see for the discussion of a typology of parties in Africa, Erdmann 1999; 2004: 76-80. 
xv   Table 4 has no systematic rational but an illustrative purpose only which should indicate possible 
variances of ethnic groups and political parties. 
xvi  For the sources and discussion of ethnicity see: Horowitz 1985, Lentz 1994; Lentz and Nugent 
2000; Lonsdale 1992; Young 1976, 2002. 
xvii  For example, the controversy of the third-term issue for presidential candidates has split the ruling 
party and fragmented the party system in Zambia and Malawi, while in Namibia both remained 
intact without major internal tensions. 
xviii Kenya, Zambia, Ghana, Tanzania are clearly such cases; Burnell 2001; Hornsby and Throup 1998; 
Throup 2003; Frempong 2001. 
xix  A similar point is made by Crook (1997: 241) and Mozzafar et al. (2003: 389). Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa  23 
References 
Basedau, Matthias (2002): Zum Zusammenhang von Wahlsystem, Parteiensystem und 
Demokratiestabilität in Afrika. Kritische Anmerkungen zum Potenzial von Electoral 
Engineering, in: Africa Spectrum, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 311-333. 
Basedau, Matthias (2005): A Preliminary Inquiry into the Causes of One-party Dominance in 
Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa. Paper prepared for the biannual European Con-
sortium of Political Research Conference, Budapest / Hungary, Sept. 
Bendel, Petra (1996): Parteiensysteme in Zentralamerika: Typologien und Erklärungs-
faktoren. Opladen: Leske & Budrich. 
Bogaards, Matthijs (2000): Crafting Competitive Party Systems: Electoral Laws and the 
Opposition in Africa, in: Democratization, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 164-166. 
Bogaards, Matthijs (2003): Counting Parties and Identifying (Dominant) Party Systems in 
Africa, in: European Journal of Political Research, no. 43, pp. 173-197. 
BND (1998): Bundesnachrichtendienst. München 
Burnell, Peter (2001): The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia: Continuities Past, 
Present and Future, in: African Affairs, vol. 100, no. 399, p. 260. 
Cox, Gary W. (1997): Making Votes Count. Strategic coordination in the World’s electoral 
systems. Cambridge: University Press. 
Cranenburg, Oda van (1996): Tanzania’s 1995 multi-party elections. The emerging party 
system, in: Party Politics, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 535-547. 
Crook, Richard C. (1997): Winning Coalitions and Ethno-Regional Politics: The Failure of the 
Opposition in the 1990 and 1995 Elections in Côte d’Ivoire, in: African Affairs, vol. 96, 
no. 383, pp. 215-242. 
Duverger, Maurice (1992, first published 1951): Les partis politiques. Paris: Colin. 
Erdmann, Gero (1999): Parteien in Afrika. Versuch eines Neuanfangs in der Parteien-
forschung, in: Afrika Spectrum, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 375-93. 
Erdmann, Gero (2002): Zur Typologie politischer Parteien in Afrika, in: Afrika Spectrum, 
vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 259-285 
Erdmann, Gero (2004): Party Research: Western Bias and the ‘African labyrinth’, in: 
Democratization, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 63-87. 
Erdmann, Gero / Weiland, Heribert (2000): Gesellschaftliche Konfliktlinien, Ethnizität und 
Parteienformation in Afrika, in: Eith, Ulrich / Mielke, Gerd (eds.), Gesellschaftliche 
Konflikte und Parteiensysteme, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 246-262. 
Frempong, Alexander K.  D. (2001): Ghana’s Election 2000: The Ethnic Undercurrent, in: 
Ayee, Joseph R. A. (ed.), Deepening Democracy in Ghana. Politics of the 2000 Elections, 
vol. 1, Legon: Freedom Publications, pp. 141-159. 24  Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa 
Giliomee, Hermann; Simkins, Charles (eds.) (1999): The Awkward Embrace. One-party 
Dominance and Democracy. Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers. 
Hartmann, Christof (2007): Paths of Electoral Reform in Africa, in: Basedau, Matthias; 
Erdmann, Gero; Mehler, Andreas (eds.), Political Parties and Elections in Contemporary 
Africa. Conceptual Problems, Empirical Findings and the Road Ahead, Uppsala: The 
Nordic Africa Institute, pp. 144-167. 
Horowitz, Donald L. (1985): Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Kuenzi, Michelle / Lambright, Gina (2001): Party System Institutionalization in 30 African 
Countries, in: Party Politics, vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 437-468. 
Laakso, Markku / Taagepera, Rein (1979): ‘Effective’ Number of Parties: A Measure with 
Application to West Europa, in: Comparative Political Studies 
Lentz, Carola / Nugent, Paul (2000): Ethnicity in Ghana: A Comparative Perspective, in: 
Lentz, Carola; Nugent, Paul (eds.), Ethnicity in Ghana, London: Macmillan Press, pp. 1-
29. 
Lijphart, Arend (1994): Electoral Systems and Party Systems. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Lindberg, Staffan (2005): Consequences of Electoral Systems in Africa: A Preliminary 
Inquiry, in: Electoral Studies, vol. 24, pp. 41-64. 
Linz, Juan J. / Stepan, Alfred (1996): Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America and Post-communist Europe. Baltimore / London: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Lipset, Seymour Martin / Rokkan, Stein (1967): Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and 
Voter Alignments, in: Lipset, Seymour Martin; Rokkan, Stein (eds.), Party Systems and 
Voter Alignments. Cross-National Perspectives, New York: Free Press, pp. 1-64. 
Lonsdale, John (1992): The Moral Economy of Mau Mau: Wealth, Poverty & Civic Virtue in 
Kikuyu Political Thought, in: Berman, Bruce; Lonsdale, John (eds.), Unhappy Valley. 
Conflict in Kenya & Africa, Book Two: Violence & Ethnicity, London: James Currey, 
pp. 315-504. 
Mainwaring, Scott / Scully, Timothy R. (1995): Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America, 
in: Mainwaring, Scott; Scully, Timothy R. (eds.), Building Democratic Institutions. Party 
Systems in Latin America, Stanford: University Press, pp. 1-36. 
Manning, Carrie (2005): Assessing African Party Systems after the Third Wave, in: Party 
Politics, vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 707-727. 
Merkel, Wolfgang (1999): Systemtransformation. Opladen: Leske+Budrich. 
Mozaffar, Shaheen / Scaritt, James R. / Galaich, Glen (2003): Electoral Institutions, Ethno-
political Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa’s Emerging Democracies, in: American 
Political Science Review, vol. 97, no. 3, pp. 379-390. Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa  25 
Nohlen, Dieter (42003): Wahlrecht und Parteiensystem. Opladen: Leske + Budrich. 
Nohlen, Dieter; Krennerich, Michael; Thibaut, Bernhard (eds.) (1999): Elections in Africa.  
A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pempel, T. J. (1990): Uncommon Democracies: The One-party Dominant Regimes. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Rakner, Lise / Svåsand, Lars (2004): From Dominant to Competitive Party System. The 
Zambian Experience 1991-2001, in: Party Politics, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 49-68. 
Randall, Vicky / Svåsand, Lars (2002): Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to 
‘Democracy and Democratic Consolidation’, in: Democratization, vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 1-10. 
Rimanelli, Marco (ed.) (1999): Comparative Democratization and Peaceful Change in Single-
party-dominant Countries. New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Sartori, Giovanni (1968): Political Development and Political Engineering, in: Public Policy, 
vol. 17, pp. 261-298. 
Sartori, Giovanni (1976): Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Scaritt, James R. / Mozaffar, Shaheen (1999): The Specification of Ethnic Cleavages and 
Ethnopolitical Groups for the Analysis of Democratic Competition in Contemporary 
Africa, in: Nationalism & Ethnic Politics, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 82-117. 
Schmidt, Siegmar (1996): Zur Rolle der politischen Parteien in afrikanischen Demokra-
tisierungsprozessen, in: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Auslandsinformationen, no. 6, pp. 
41-62. 
Szajkowski, Bogdan (ed.) (2005): Political Parties of the World. London: John Harper. 
Walle, Nicolas van de (2003): Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party 
Systems, in: Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 297-321. 
Walle, Nicolas van de / Smiddy Buttler, Kimberly (1999): Political Parties and Party Systems 
in Africa’s Illiberal Democracies, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol.  8, 
no. 1, pp. 14-28. 
Widner, Jennifer A. (1997): Political Parties and Civil Societies in Sub-Saharan Africa, in: 
Marina Ottaway (ed.), Democracy in Africa. The Hard Road Ahead, Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, pp. 65-82. 
Young, Crawford (1976): The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
Young, Crawford (2002): Ethnicity and Politics in Africa. Critical Themes in African Studies. 
Boston: Boston University African Studies Center. 
 
 
 26  Erdmann/Basedau: Party Systems in Africa 
Appendix 
Country Election   
year 
Vote  
share  
winner 
Winning party  Seat 
share 
winner
Freedom House 
(election year, 
average) 
Sartori I  
(absolute majority  
50% +1) 
Angola  1992 53.7  MPLA  58.6  6  Dom. 
Benin  1991 18.9  UDFP-MDPS-ULD 18.8  2.5  Pulver 
  1995 15.4  RB  25.3  2.5  Pulver 
  1999 22.7  RB  32.5  2.5  Pulver 
  2003 n.a.  UBF  37.4  2.5  Pulver 
Botswana  1965 80.4  BDP  90.3  n.a.  Dom. 
  1969 68.3  BDP  77.4  n.a.  Dom. 
  1974 76.6  BDP  84.4  2  Dom. 
  1979 75.2  BDP  90.6  2.5  Dom. 
  1984 68.0  BDP  82.4  2  Dom. 
  1989 64.8  BDP  91.2  1.5  Dom. 
  1994 54.7  BDP  67.5  2.5  Dom. 
  1999 57  BDP  82.5  2.0  Dom. 
Burkina Faso  1992 48.5  ODP-MT  72.9  5  Dom.-auth. 
  1997 68.6  CDP  91  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
  2002 49.5  CDP  51.3  4  Dom.-auth. 
Burundi  1993 72.6  FRODEBU  80.2  7  Dom.-auth. 
Cameroon  1992 45.5  RDPC  48.9  5.5  Non-dom.-auth. 
  1997 48  RDPC  60.6  6  Dom.-auth. 
  2002 n.a.  RDPC  82.8  6  Dom.-auth. 
Cape Verde  1991 66.4  MDP  70.9  2.5  Dom. 
  1995 61.3  MDP  69.4  1.5  Dom. 
  2001 49.9  PAICV  55.5  1.5  Dom. 
CAR  1993 n.a.  MLPC  40  3.5  Non-dom. 
  1998 n.a.  MLPC  43.1  3.5  Non-dom. 
Chad  1997 34.4  MPS  50.4  5.5  Dom.-auth. 
  2002 n.a.  MPS  70.6  5.5  Dom.-auth. 
Comoros  1992 n.a.  UDD  16.7  3  Pulver 
  1993 n.a.  RDR  66.7  4  Dom.-auth. 
  1996 n.a.  RND  90.7  4  Dom.-auth. 
Congo  1992 n.a.  UPADS  31.2  3  Pulver 
  1993 n.a.  UPADS  37.6  4  Pulver-auth. 
  2002 n.a.  PCT  34.2  5  Non-dom.-auth. 
Côte d’ivoire  1990 71.7  PDCI  93.1  5  Dom.-auth. 
  1995 64.9  PDCI  85.1  5.5  Dom.-auth. 
  2000 n.a.  FPI  42.7  5  Non-dom.-auth. 
Djibouti  1992 74.6  RPP  100  6  Dom.-auth 
  1997 78.6  RPP-FRUD  100  5.5  Dom.-auth. 
  2003 62.7  UMP  100  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
Equatorial Guinea 1993 69.8  PDGE  85  7  Dom.-auth. 
  1999 85.5  PDGE  93.7  7  Dom.-auth. 
  2004 n.a.  PDGE  98  6.5  Dom.-auth. 
Ethiopia  1995 n.a.  EPRDF  86.1  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
  2000 n.a.  EPRDF  85  5  Dom.-auth. 
Gabun  1990 n.a.  PDG  52.5  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
  1996 n.a.  PDG  70  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
  2001 n.a.  PDG  70.8  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
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Country Election   
year 
Vote  
share  
winner 
Winning party  Seat 
share 
winner
Freedom House 
(election year, 
average) 
Sartori I  
(absolute majority  
50% +1) 
Gambia  1966 n.a.  PPP  75  n.a.  Dom. 
  1972 n.a.  PPP  87.5  2  Dom. 
  1977 n.a.  PPP  79.4  2  Dom. 
  1982 n.a.  PPP  77.  2.5  Dom.-auth. 
  1987 n.a.  PPP  86.1  3  Dom.-auth. 
  1992 58.1  PPP  69.4  1.5  Dom. 
  1996/7 52.2  APRC  77.3  6.5  Dom.-auth. 
  2002 n.a.  APRC  84.9  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
Ghana  1992 77.5  NDC  94.5  5  Dom.-auth. 
  1996 53  NDC  66.5  3.5  Dom. 
  2000 45  NPP  49.7  2.5  Non-dom. 
Guinea  1995 53.5  PUP  62.2  5.5  Dom.-auth. 
  2002 n.a.  PUP  74.6  5.5  Dom.-auth. 
Guinea-Bissau  1995 46.4  PAIGC  62.0  3.5  Dom. 
  1999 n.a.  PRS  37.3  4  Non-dom. 
  2004 n.a.  PAIGC  40,9  4  Non-dom. 
Kenya  1992 24.5  KANU  52.5  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
  1997 n.a.  KANU  51.4  6  Dom.-auth. 
  2002 n.a.  NARC  58.9  4  Non-dom. 
Lesotho  1993 74.8  BCP  100  3.5  Dom.-auth. 
  1998 60.6  LCD  97.5  4  Dom.-auth. 
  2002 54.9  LCD  65.2  2.5  Dom. 
Liberia  1997 n.a.  NPP  76,6  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
Madagascar  1960 n.a.  PSD  59,8  n.a.  Dom. 
  1965 n.a.  PSD  97,2  n.a.  Dom.-auth. 
  1970 n.a.  PSD  97,2  n.a.  Dom.-auth. 
  1977 n.a.  AREMA  81,8  5  Dom.-auth. 
  1983 n.a.  AREMA  85,5  5.5  Dom.-auth. 
  1989 n.a.  AREMA  86.8  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
  1993 n.a.  CartelHVR  34.1  3  Pulver 
  1998 n.a.  ARES  42  3  Non-dom. 
  2002 n.a.  TIM  64.4  3.5  Dom. 
Malawi  1994 46.4  UDF  48  4  Non-dom. 
  1999 47.3  UDF  48.4  2.5  Non-dom. 
  2004 n.a  MCP  30.5  3  Non-dom. 
Mali  1992 48.4  ADEMA  65.5  2.5  Dom. 
  1997 75.3  ADEMA  87.1  3  Dom. 
  2002 n.a.  Espoir2002  41.25  4  Non-dom. 
Mauritania  1992 67.7  PRDS  84.8  6.5  Dom.-auth. 
  1996 67.6  PRDS  88.6  6  Dom.-auth. 
  2001 51.5.  PRDS  79  5  Dom.-auth. 
Mauritius  1976 40.9  MMM  48.6  2.5  Non-dom. 
  1982 63  MMM/PSM  90.9  2  Dom. 
  1983 45.6  MSM/PT/PMSD  65.7  2  Dom. 
  1987 47.3  MSM/PT/PMSD  62.9  2  Dom. 
  1991 55.4  MSM  45.5  1.5  Non-dom. 
  1995 65.2  PT/MMM  90.9  1.5  Dom. 
  2000 51.7  MSM/MMM  81.4  1.5  Dom. 
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Country Election   
year 
Vote  
share  
winner 
Winning party  Seat 
share 
winner
Freedom House 
(election year, 
average) 
Sartori I  
(absolute majority  
50% +1) 
Mozambique  1994 44.3  FRELIMO  51.6  4  Dom. 
  1999 48.5  FRELIMO  53.2  3.5  Dom. 
Namibia  1989 57.3  SWAPO  56.9  3.5  Dom. 
  1994 73.9  SWAPO  73.6  2.5  Dom. 
  1999 76.3  SWAPO  76.4  2.5  Dom. 
Niger  1993 30.7  MNSD  34.9  3.5  Non-dom. 
  1995 n.a.  MNSD  34.9  4  Non-dom. 
  1996* 56.7  UNIRD  71.1  6  Dom.-auth. 
  1999* n.a.  MNSD  45.7  5  Non-dom. 
Nigeria  1992 n.a.  SDP  53.3  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
  1999 n.a.  PDP  60.1  3.5  Dom. 
  2003 n.a.  PDP  75.5  4  Dom. 
Rwanda  2003 n.a.  FPR  62.3  6  Dom.-auth. 
Sao Tomé  1991 54.4  PCD-GR  60  2.5  Dom. 
  1994 42.5  MLSTP  49  1.5  Non-dom. 
  1998 50.8  MLSTP  56.4  1.5  Dom. 
  2002 39.6  MLSTP  43.6  1.5  Non-dom. 
Senegal  1978 81.7  PS  83  3.5  Dom.-auth. 
  1983 75.9  PS  92.5  4  Dom.-auth. 
  1988 71  PS  85.8  3.5  Dom.-auth. 
  1993 56.6  PS  70  4.5  Dom. 
  1998 50.2  PS  66.4  4  Dom. 
  2001 49.6  SOPI  74.2  3.5  Dom. 
Seychellen  1993 56.6  SPPF  81.8  3.5  Dom. 
  1998 61.7  SPPF  88.2  3  Dom. 
  2003 n.a.  SPPF  60.1  3  Dom. 
Sierra Leone  1996 35.9  SLPP  39.7  4.5  Non-dom.-auth. 
  2002 n.a.  SLPP  74.1  4  Dom. 
South Africa  1994 62.6  ANC  63  3.5  Dom. 
  1999 66.3  ANC  66.5  1.5  Dom. 
  2004 69.7  ANC  69.8  1.5  Dom. 
Tanzania  1995 59.2  CCM  79.6  5  Dom.-auth. 
  2000 n.a.  CCM  91  4  Dom.-auth. 
Togo  1994 n.a.  RPT  43.2  5.5  Non-dom.-auth. 
  1999 n.a.  RPT  97.5  5  Dom.-auth. 
  2002 n.a.  RPT  88.9  5.5  Dom.-auth. 
Zambia  1991 74.3  MMD  83.3  2.5  Dom. 
  1996 61  MMD  87.3  4.5  Dom.-auth. 
  2001 28  MMD  46  4.5  Non-dom.-auth. 
Zimbabwe  1980 63.0  ZANU-PF  57.0  4  Dom. 
  1985 77.2  ZANU-PF  64  6  Dom. 
  1990 80.5  ZANU-PF  97.5  5  Dom.-auth. 
  1995 81.4  ZANU-PF  98.3  5  Dom.-auth. 
  2000 48.8  ZANU-PF  51.7  5.5  Dom.-auth. 
Note:  n.a. = not available. 
Sources: www.electionworld.org; http://africanelections.tripod.com/; Nohlen et al. 1999; Africa South of Sahara, 
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